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BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS
MARK S. DA VIES*
INTRODUCTION
The national trends of "decentralization" and "privatization"
present a challenge to local governments.' Federal and state
governments are transferring ever larger numbers of public tasks to
local officials. At the same time, local governments, like all levels of
government, are turning over many functions to the private sector.
The current challenge for local government law is to ensure that
public interests survive as service provision moves from national and
state to local and from local to private institutions.
This challenge of preserving public interests while increasing
reliance on the local private sector is often met by the creation of
Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs"). Authorized by state
statutes,' BIDs are special districts where property owners voluntarily
* Associate, Mayer, Brown and Platt. B.A. 1992, Yale University; J.D. 1995, University
of Chicago. Former law clerk for Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Thanks to Dan Kahan, Christopher Yoo and Rachel Laser.
1. See, e.g., Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1103 (7th Cir. 1995) ("There
is a nationwide movement toward the decentralization and privatization of governmental
functions ....").
2. The following states have enacted statutes authorizing "business improvement
districts": Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 11-54B-I to 11-54B-20 (1994); California, CAL. STS. &
HIGH. CODE §§ 36601-36651 (West Supp. 1996); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-25-
1201 to 31-25-1228 (West 1990); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1501-1507 (Supp.
1996); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-43-1 to 36-43-9 (1993); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 50-1701
to 50-1771 (1994); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1781 to 12-1793 (1991); Massachusetts,
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tax themselves to fund an improvement association.' Cities usually
collect the mandatory taxes and city officials are always represented
on the associations, as are area residents. Associations make public
area improvements, such as pedestrian walkways, and provide other
services, such as extra sanitation.
Since the 1980s, the number of BIDs has increased dramatically,
and their prevalence has provoked controversy.4 Some critics, most
prominently Michael Sandel, complain that BIDs exacerbate
interlocal inequality: "As municipal services decline in urban areas,
residents and businesses in upscale districts manage to insulate
themselves from the effects by assessing themselves surtaxes to
provide private garbage collection, street cleaning, and police
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 400, §§ 1-10 (West 1996); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-12-1101 to 7-
12-1151 (1995); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4015 to 19-4038 (1991); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 3-63-1 to 3-63-16 (Michie Supp. 1995); New York, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§§ 980 to 980-p (Consol. Supp. 1997); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-22.1-01 to
40-22.1-14 (Supp. 1995); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1551-1554 (1974 & Supp.
1996); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 9-55-1 to 9-55-21 (Supp. 1994);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-84-101 to 7-84-530 (1992 & Supp. 1996); Utah, UTAH
CODEANN. §§ 17A-3-401 to 17A-3-414 (1991).
The following states have passed similar legislation under different names: Arizona
(Municipal Improvement Districts), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-691 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1996); Florida (Neighborhood Improvement Districts), FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.501-
163.523 (West 1990); Illinois (Local Improvements), ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-1-1 to 5/9-
5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); Indiana (Economic Improvement Districts), IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-7-22-1 to 36-7-22-21 (Michie 1989); Kentucky (Community Improvement Districts), KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 107.310-107.410 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); Minnesota (Sidewalk
Improvement Districts), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 435.44 (West 1987); Mississippi (Local
Improvement Taxing Districts), MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 21-33-501 to 21-33-525 (Supp. 1996);
Missouri (Neighborhood improvement Districts), Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 67.453-67.457 (West
1996); New Jersey (Improvement Districts), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17-39 (West 1991); Ohio
(Special Improvement Districts), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1710.01-1710.13 (Banks-Baldwin
1993 & Supp. 1996).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (Consol. Supp. 1997).
4. See, e.g., Bruce Lambert, Ater Rapid Growth, B.LD. 's Enter Time of Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at 13-6 (stating that the rapid growth of BIDs in New York City stopped
abruptly in 1995 due to allegations of wrongdoing, and subsequent investigation and criticism);
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid
Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.L 1165, 1199 n.166 (1996) (reporting study
published in 1994 that found 1,000 BIDs in the United States and Canada). For a description of
the most recent BID, see Stephen C. Fehr, Property Owners Commit to Revive D.C., WASH.
POST, July 27, 1997, at Al.
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protection unavailable to the city as a whole."5 Others credit BIDs
with the revival of urban cities such as Philadelphia and New York.6
In a technique, if not application, familiar to lawyers, this Article
"interprets" BIDs. As Michael Sandel puts the point: "[Ojur practices
and institutions are embodiments of theory.... they are themselves
embodiments of ideas."7 Just as interpreting the meaning of a
statutory phrase requires lawyers to make "sense not nonsense" out of
relevant language, cases and background legal norms, interpreting a
local institution requires an account that makes "sense" of relevant
practices and norms.' In both instances, interpretation consists of
identifying the "core ideas" that animate the political act and
connecting those ideas to shared experiences and values.9
Interpreting BIDs will serve at least three goals. First, an
understanding of BIDs should help assess proposed BID reforms and
guide the creation of new districts. Second, understanding BIDs will
permit a fair assessment of Sandel's complaint that BIDs are
exacerbating interlocal inequality. Third, the explanation will show
how architectural theory, here New Urbanism, can contribute to
understanding local government institutions."l
5. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 331 (1996) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT] (adopting Robert Reich's
view that BIDs represent the "scoession" of wealthy areas from urban city).
6. See, e.g., William J. Bratton, New Strategies for Combating Crime in New York City
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781, 789 (1996) (New York's former police commissioner crediting
business improvement districts for making many of the city's areas cleaner and safer); Maryann
Haggerty & Margaret Webb Pressler, Developers Bet Millions that Downtown D.C. Is Far
From Dead, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at Al, A7 ("Credit for a noticeable turnaround in
[Philadelphia] . . . goes to a new convention center and a 'business improvement
district' .... ").
7. DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, supra note 5, at ix; see also JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD,
FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION 3 (1995).
8. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 20, 22 (1983)
("Moral argument ... is interpretive in character, closely resembling the work of a lawyer or
judge who struggles to find meaning in a morass of conflicting laws and precedents.").
Interpretation in this sense collapses any real distinction between description and evaluation;
the description is normative and the norms are derived from the description.
9. See id. at 20.
10. Vincent Skully argues that architecture is "one of humanity's major strategies" to
"protect human beings from nature in one way or another and to mitigate the effect upon them
of nature's immutable laws." Vincent Skully, The Architecture of Community, in PETER KATZ,
1997]
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This Article has five parts. Part I describes a typical BID
authorization statute. The next two parts describe the three "core
ideas" of the BID statute. Part II uses political theory, as articulated
in Supreme Court opinions, and welfare economics to explain the
form of BIDs. Part III describes New Urbanism and argues that New
Urbanism also helps explain BIDs. The remainder of the Article uses
the proffered BID interpretation in two ways. Part IV offers an
"internal" critique of BIDs, suggesting that the three core ideas can
help generate and evaluate BID reforms. Part V considers and
ultimately rejects the complaint that BIDs contribute to interlocal
inequality.
I. BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS: AN OVERVIEW
This Part provides an overview of a typical BID statute. A BID is
operated primarily by a carefully balanced representative institution
and is restricted to performing limited functions. Understanding the
voting structure and permitted functions of BIDs is crucial to
ascertaining their core ideas.
Under New York law, New York City's council may establish
BIDs. 1 New York established its first BID in 1984.12 Establishing a
BID requires a district plan, including a map of the district and a list
of the properties within the district that will be subject to a "district
charge."' 3 If a majority of the property owners do not protest the
THE NEW URBANISM: TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY 221 (1994) [hereinafter
KATZ, NEW URBANISM]. More particularly, "[a]rchitecture is fiindamentally a matter not of
individual buildings but of the shaping of community, and that, as in Paris, Uruk, or Siena, is
done by the law." Id. at 229. A "Law and Architecture" movement might benefit the local
government literature. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047,
1089-1094 (1996) (summarizing the ideas of New Urbanism).
11. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-f (Consol. Supp. 1997).
12. Douglas Martin, Districts to Improve Business Proliferate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1994, at B3.
13. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 980-a(a), (b)(8) (Consol. Supp. 1997). The city planning
commission then reviews the district plan and sends copies of the plan to the city council and
the area's community board. See § 980-d(c). New York has fifty-nine "community boards [that
have] advisory and consultative powers concerning budgets, land use, and service provisions."
Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 339, 403 (1993) [hereinafter Briffault, Who Rules?]. If the area includes properties
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/15
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creation of the district (and concomitant tax increase) and the council
declares the BID in the "public interest," a BID is formed. 4
In addition, in New York a "district management association"
(DMA) is formed to operate the BID. 5 The DMA has the authority to
provide for voting representation of property owners and tenants
within the district. 6 The board of directors of the DMA is composed
of representatives of owners and tenants within the district. However,
more than half of the members of the board must be property owners,
and commercial and residential tenants within the district must also
be represented on the board. 7 In addition, the DMA's board must
include four members from the city government.18
DMAs can only spend district charges on two types of
improvements. First, the statute provides a detailed list of possible
improvements to "municipally or district owned or leased property
which will restore or promote business activity in the district."' 9 The
improvements include construction on existing streets, and the
creation of physically aesthetic safety fixtures, landscaping and park
areas, and parking facilities.2" The dominant focus of this first type of
improvement is to make the area more attractive to pedestrians. It
authorizes constructing "pedestrian overpasses," "pedestrian malls,"
located in more than one community district, the city planning commission will send a copy to
the borough president and borough board. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(c). The
community boards must notify the public and may hold a hearing. See id. The city planning
commission must then hold a hearing and submit its report and the community board's
recommendation to the mayor, the affected borough president, and the city council. Id.
14. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-f(bX1) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
15. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 980-m(a).
16. Id. The statute calculates voting rights based on property ownership in two ways.
First, under "record ownership," anyone who owns property in the proposed district gets one
vote. Second, under the "assessed valuation" approach, the vote is weighted by the city tax
revenue generated by the property. See id. However, the total number of votes under one
property owner's control must not exceed one-third of the total votes. See id.
17. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-m(b) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
18. Id. In a city with a population of one million or more, each of the chief executive
officer of the city, the chief financial official of the city, the borough president where the district
is located, and the council member of the district appoint one member to the DMA board. See
19. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c(a) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
20. Id.
1997]
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and "pedestrian shelters."' The goal is to "enhance the movement,
convenience and enjoyment of the public. 22
Second, the DMA has broad authority to propose expenditure on
"additional services required for the enjoyment and protection of the
public and the promotion and enhancement of the district."'  These
services might include "enhanced sanitation," marketing and
advertising for businesses within the district, "decorations and
lighting for seasonal and holiday purposes, and enhancing security
within the district.2 The DMA can also approve the private use of
public land within the district.
2 1
Along with the DMA, the city council helps operate the district.
BID taxes are collected by the city along with city taxes.26 The city
council may also raise funds for the district by selling bonds.2 The
resulting debt is counted as city debt and the city must, of course,
stay below its New York constitutional debt limit.28 All district
spending "must be [for services that are] in addition to or an
enhancement of those provided by the municipality prior to the
establishment of the district.,
29
Most BIDs across the country are similar to those in New York.
New York is now the center of BID activity and at last count had
thirty-four BIDs.3° While a few BIDs have taxed residential property
21. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 980-c(a)(5),(7), (11).
22. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 980-c(a)(1 1).
23. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c(c).
24. Id.
25. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-ne(d).
26. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(b).
27. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(c)
28. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-k.
29. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(a).
30. According to the New York Times, on February 11, 1996 there were thirty-four BIDS
in New York City. See Jane H. Lii, Security and Sanitation Are Priories in a New Business
District, N.Y. TiMm, Feb. 11, 1996, at 13-10. In December 1995, the New York Times reported
that the last ten years had seen the number of New York BIDs rise from seven to thirty-three
and that thirty-nine more BIDs were under consideration. See Michael Cooper, Money Woes:
BID in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995 at 13-14. New York has more BIDs than any other
city, in part because the New York statute puts the burden on property owners to stop, rather
than approve, a district. Compare Legislative Finding and Declaration, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
980 (Consol. Supp. 1997) ("It is the intent of the State to provide a more streamlined process of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/15
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in the business district, others have taxed businesses rather than
property owners, with limited success." BIDs have also been set up
for residential and industrial areas. 32 Moreover, some proposed BIDs
would rely on voluntary, rather than mandatory, tax assessments.33 In
Washington, D.C., the proposed BID law would not rely on the city
government to collect BID taxes.34 Some states, such as Florida,
provide even more detailed suggestions for BID fund spending.
In practice, most BIDs cover a small area of no more than a few
blocks, assess minimal taxes, and provide only simple services. One
journalist reports that "[i]t is at the small neighborhood level rather
than in the central business district that most of the business
improvement districts have been formed. 36 Other BIDs are far more
ambitious, covering large areas, assessing higher taxes, and issuing
bonds to finance large-scale "improvements. 37
BIDs present several questions, including: Why are BIDs focused
on attracting pedestrians rather than cars or businesses to the
downtown area? Why are city officials and residents, who pay no
increased taxes, required to have some unspecified association
establishing and operating these districts....") with Judith Evans, D.C. Wants to Join the Boom
for BIDs; Improvement Districts' Accomplishments Cited, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1996, at El
(stating that BIDs in Washington, D.C. require approval from 51% of property owners and their
commercial tenants).
31. See Vicki Torres, A Bid for Improvement; Business Districts Pool Resources to Draw
Patrons, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at DI (attributing demise of downtown BID to tax
assessments on small business owners rather than property owners).
32. See Lii, supra note 30, at 13-10 (describing the 180th Street BID, the first BID in
Queens and the second in New York City).
33. See Business Improvement Fees: A Winning Idea-If Voluntary, WASH. BuS. J., May
14, 1993.
34. Id. Such a provision, not part of the original proposal, is either the result of the well-
know administrative problems of the D.C. government or was an effort to control the committee
assignment of the bill.
35. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.514(4),(5),(15),(16),(18), 163.517 (West 1990).
36. Alan S. Oser, Perspectives: Business Improvement Districts; Banding Together for
Local Betterment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991, at 10-5; see also Evans, supra note 30, at El
(.'The most important part of [BIDs] is that they organize and focus activities of businesses
from neighborhood to neighborhood."') (quoting a D.C. council member who sponsored the
BID legislation).
37. See Thomas J. Lueck, Business Districts Grow, at Price of Accountability, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at 1-1 (describing plan for a BID in New York covering over 40 blocks
to provide residential security with 350 to 500 security officers).
1997]
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representation? Why are the tax increases limited to property owners
and why are they mandatory? Why do property owners so often vote
to increase their own taxes? To answer these and similar questions,
the next two Parts try to make sense out of the BIDs statutes.
II. DEMOCRATIC AND EcoNOMIc EXPLANATIONS FOR BIDS
This Part begins the effort to identify the core values latent in
BIDs by considering whether the United States Supreme Court
decisions explain any distinctive features of BIDs. Part II.B argues
that BIDs are best explained by the dissenting opinions in Avery v.
Midland County.38 Part II.C provides a welfare economic account of
BIDs. This Part concludes that political and economic theories are
useful but cannot explain all of BIDs' unique features.
A. The Supreme Court's Binary Local Equal Protection Doctrine
The first place lawyers look to understand the form of local
government is usually case law. Through its interpretations of the
Constitution's equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has shaped
the design of certain local governments. Because BIDs involve voting
and have traditional government features, it is plausible that the
Court's decisions account for certain core BID ideas. The Court,
however, does not acknowledge, and its decisions therefore do not
explain, the need for voting structures that depart from egalitarian
norms.
Four years after Reynolds v. Sims,39 in which the Court interpreted
the equal protection clause to require States to comply with the one-
person, one-vote rule, the Court applied the same principle to a
county government.4" In Avery v. Midland County, the vote of each
38. 390 U.S. 474,486,495, 509 (1968) (Harlan, J., Fortas, J., and Stewart, J., respectively
dissenting).
39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. See Avery, 390 U.S. 474,485-86 ("[TIhe Constitution imposes one ground rule for the
development of arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with general
governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single-member
districts of substantially unequal population.").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/15
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subdivision in part determined representation on the Midland County,
Texas government. Because ninety-five percent of county residents
lived in one subdivision, individuals living outside that subdivision
had a larger influence over the county government than those living
within." One argument in defense of such a scheme was that the
county government dealt with rural issues and thus it made sense for
the more rural, less populated, subdivisions to have disproportionate
influence.42 The Court held that the voting structure of the county
government violated the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.43
The majority opinion in Avery suggested that whether or not the
equal protection clause applies depends on whether the local
government had "general governmental powers." Even though the
statute involved in Avery carefully enumerated the powers of the
county government, the Court found that the county government is a
"general government."'45 However, in separate dissents, Justice Fortas
argued that Midland County did not possess general powers,46 while
Justice Harlan predicted that such a limitation would allow all local
governments to avoid the decision simply by "classify[ing] the
governmental unit as other than 'general' in power and
responsibility."'47
A review of post-Avery cases suggests that, as Justice Harlan
predicted, the "general" label does not sort cases with any coherence.
41. Seeid. at475-76.
42. See id. at 484.
43. 390 U.S. at 484-85. The Court elaborated:
Were the [county government] a special-purpose unit of government assigned the
performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other
constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be
apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the
organization's functions. That question, however, is not presented by this case ....
... We hold today only that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.
ld.
44. Id. at 484-86.
45. Id. at 483-485.
46. See id. at 499 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 492 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1997]
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For example, the Court has issued three decisions invalidating city
schemes that limited voting on bond issues to property owners.48 The
Court, however, has also approved restricting voting to property
owners on three occasions.49 The Court's constitutional scrutiny of
local government arrangements that weight the vote in favor of those
most interested in the particular local government has foundered on
the enduring need of localities to align local power with local
interest."0
48. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), city property owners voted on
whether to issue bonds to finance the city's utility system. In City of Phoenix v. Kolodzlejski,
399 U.S. 204 (1970), and again in Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), city property owners
voted on the issuance of general obligation bonds. In all three cases, the Court ruled that non-
property owners must have the same voting power as property owners in the bond issuance.
For example, in Kolodziejski, the Court found that property owners might ultimately pass the
cost of taxes that funded the municipal bonds to their tenants. See 399 U.S. at 210. Therefore,
the Court stated that although property owners' interests were different from those of non-
property owners in the bond issuance, non-property owners were not less interested in the
issuance of these bonds than were property owners. See id. at 212.
49. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973),
involved a water storage district comprising nearly 200,000 acres of sparsely populated
farmland. The district fixed tolls for the use of water and assessed the costs of various water
projects to property based on the benefit of the project to each property. Only land owners could
vote for district directors and the land owner votes were proportional to assessed land
valuations. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S.
743 (1973), decided the same day, involved a similar district in Wyoming. Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355 (1981), involved a large water reclamation district that supplied water to an area
including a major part of Phoenix and was one of the largest electricity producers in Arizona.
Voting for the district's directors was limited to those who owned land within the district and
voting power was weighted according to the property's size. The Court approved the voting
regulations of the three water districts because of their special limited, rather than general,
purposes. For example, in Ball, finding that the function of water reclamation district were
narrow and special, see 451 U.S. at 370, the Court concluded:
mhe voting scheme for the District is constitutional because it bears a reasonable
relationship to its statutory objectives. Here .... the subscription of land which made
the . . .District possible might well have never occurred had not the subscribing
landowners been assured a special voice in the conduct of the District's business.
Therefore,... the State could rationally limit the vote to landowners. Moreover,
Arizona could xationally make the weight of their vote dependent upon the number of
acres they own, since that number reasonably reflects the relative risks they incurred as
landowners and the distribution of the benefits and the burdens of the District's water
operations.
Id. at 371.
50. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 114 (1990) ("IThe differences in local needs and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/15
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The result of the majority decision in Avery is a binary democratic
doctrine. If the equal protection clause is applicable, all must have an
equal vote and a hybrid arrangement granting everyone some, but not
necessarily an equal, vote is not permissible." If it does not apply, a
hybrid arrangement is not required and some may be completely
denied a vote. 2 As with all binary doctrines, the stark choice posed
by deciding to apply the equal protection clause places a great deal of
pressure on the classification criteria, a pressure the "general"
distinction has not held.
Court precedent does not account for BIDs' voting structure
because BIDs fall into the Court's netherland. BIDs must provide for
citizen influence on both the board and the association but must also
retain ultimate property owner control. If the equal protection clause
applies, such an arrangement is not constitutional because, as in
Avery, all must have an equal vote. If the equal protection clause does
not apply, denying residents any vote at all is permissible. Thus, the
current BID voting structure is either less or more egalitarian than the
Court's equal protection teachings require. To understand the
conflicts among local interests make the very concept of local power as a general matter,
considered apart from the situations of particular local government and people, inherently
ambiguous."). Compare Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1992)
(en banc) (upholding a voting scheme under which only owners of commercial property located
in the rapid transit district could vote on the creation of the district) with Cunningham v.
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (invalidating a
similar voting scheme because of an excessive degree of disproportionate representation).
51. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989) (land-
ownership requirement for appointment to the board that considers local governmental
reorganization violates the Equal Protection Clause); Board of Estimate of New York v. Morris,
489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that some city-wide representation and some non-equal
participation is insufficient to survive equal protection review); Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289
(1975) (limiting franchise in city bond elections to "persons who have made available for
taxation some real, mixed, or personal property" violates equal protection clause); City of
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (Arizona statutes excluding non-property owners
from voting in bond issuance violated equal protection).
52. Briffault, relying on Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), argues that the law preserves
for "states and localities the option of using special assessment districts controlled by
developers or commercial landowners to finance costly capital improvements." Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 383
(1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Localism].
1997]
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democratic conception latent in BIDs we must look elsewhere.
B. BIDs Conception ofLocal Political Equality
Although the Court's local voting rights cases do not explain the
BID voting scheme, the arguments made but rejected in Avery are
helpful. The dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan and Fortas in
Avery, and a later concurrence by Justice Powell, explain the BID
conception of local political equality.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Avery stressed that "local governments,
unlike state governments, are often specialized in function."53 This
specialization means that different residents will have different or
unequal interest in a particular form of government, and that a
particular local government ought to be able to be structured to
accommodate such differences. Harlan suggested that "equality" was
achieved in local government by unequal voting structures that
matched unequal interests.54
The "equality" principle of BIDs permits giving those with
unequal interest in a government structure unequal power. Because
property owners are the most affected by the BIDs (they pay for it
and profit most from it), they are given majority control. Property
owners decide whether to allow a BID to form and can disband a
BID. The BID statute thus codifies Justice Harlan's "unequal interest,
unequal power" notion of local political "equality."
Unlike Justice Harlan, Justice Fortas argued in his Avery dissent
that the Court did have a role in monitoring the "unequal interest,
unequal power" balance. Justice Harlan argued that the Court should
avoid "determining the form of the country's local governments"
because "it would bid fair to plunge this Court into an avalanche of
local reapportionment cases with no firmer constitutional anchors
than its own notions of what constitutes 'equal protection' in any
given instance."55 Like Justice Harlan, Justice Fortas believed that
53. Avery, 390 U.S. at 492 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 490-94.
55. Id. at 494.
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voting authority in a local government could reflect the interest of the
voters in the activities of the local govermnent. 6 Rather than leaving
this unequal weighting of votes to the political process, however,
Justice Fortas suggested that the equal protection clause requires "a
scheme which, within wide tolerance, eliminates the gross
underrepresentation of the city, but at the same time provides an
adequate, effective voice for the nonurban, as well as the urban, areas
and people."57
The New York BID statute is consistent with Justice Fortas'
refusal to allow Justice Harlan's "unequal interest, unequal power"
notion to sanction a total lack of local electoral representation. The
statute requires representation of both local and city residents on both
the BID board and the DMA."5 In other words, it allows a "wide
tolerance" while prohibiting "gross underrepresentation" sufficient to
ensure an "adequate voice" for non-property owners.
The New York BID statute also reflects Justice Fortas' belief in
the utility of the "general government" classification. Justice Fortas
argued that the limited statutory authority of the local county
government in Avery made it a special, rather than general, type.59
The BID statute cabins the DMA ends and means. It can only seek to
restore business to the district, or to provide services for the
enjoyment of the public. The statute gives a precise delineation of the
sorts of improvements and services the DMA may provide.' At least
on paper, BIDs are local governments of limited rather than general
powers. BIDs thus reflect an endorsement of Justice Fortas' faith in
an enumerated, limited, nongeneral form of local government.
Another claim, implicitly rejected in Avery, that bears on BIDs is
the notion that a locality controlled by a larger institution, such as an
urban city or a state, may deviate from the simple equality
requirement because those adversely affected can gain relief from the
urban city or state controlling the BID. The Avery Court implicitly
56. See id. at 495 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 509.
58. See N.Y. GEN. MlN. LAW § 980-m (Consol. Supp. 1997).
59. See Avery, 390 U.S. at 507-09 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
60. See N.Y. GEN. MlUN. LAW § 980-c (Consol. Supp. 1997).
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rejected this argument when it rejected the argument that local
majorities are adequately protected by their ability to seek
redistricting in the State legislature.' In the later case of Ball v.
James, Justice Powell (in his concurring opinion) stressed the
importance of state control over the voting requirements for a special
district.62 In a footnote he allowed that two prior cases, Avery and
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. ,63 did not consider
control by a higher body relevant to whether the smaller government
unit complied with the equal protection clause.' He suggested that "it
must be evident that some of the reasoning in that [line of cases]...
has been questioned."'65
BID statutes reflect Justice Powell's idea that greater deviance
from simple equality is permissible when a large institution that
complies with the one person one vote rule has control over the
voting scheme.66 New York BIDs are creatures of state statute.67
Moreover, BIDs are under the control of the city council, which must
approve the voting arrangements and find the BID in the "public
interest."68 Therefore these two levels of "equal protection" arguably
permit some deviance from simple equality in BIDs.
61. See Briffault, Localism, supra note 52, at 348 n.26.
62. 451 U.S. 355,372,373-74 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
64. 451 U.S. 373 n.2.
65. Id. More recently, Judge Posner has stressed the importance of the control of larger
institutions to the assessment of voting rights in smaller bodies. See Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. This characterization is prevalent in litigation surrounding BIDs. In Quapaw Central
Business Improvement District v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1994), the
Arkansas Supreme Court decided a dispute between a BID's bondholders and a BID contractor
that centered on who was entitled to BID funds. Relying on the BID's taxing power, the court
stated that BIDS were "agents of the state." Id. at 392. Because the BID was an agent of the
state, certain UCC filing requirements did not apply, and the bondholders' interests were held
superior. See id A more extensive discussion of BIDs took place in City of Seattle v. Rogers
Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39 (Wash. 1990) (en banc). In Rogers Clothing local business
raised a variety of statutory and constitutional challenges to a Seattle BID ordinance, which
assessed businesses within the area on a square-foot basis for various services designed to
benefit businesses. However, the court unanimously found that this ordinance did not violate
the equal protection rights of small businesses within the BID. See id. at 49-5 1.
68. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuM. LAw § 980-f(Consol. Supp. 1997).
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To summarize, the first "core idea" of BID statutes is a notion of
local equal protection that is different from the one adopted by the
Avery majority. BID statutes endorse a view of local voting rights
that permits wide variation in voting power. The voting scheme can
therefore account for the different interests people have in the
activities of the BID. BIDs minimize the effect of this deviance from
the Avery notion of political equality by requiring some court-
enforceable minimal level of representation for both local and city
residents, providing an enumeration of ends and means, and requiring
the city council to approve all aspects of each BID, including voting
schemes, boundaries, and proposed activities.
This core idea obviously leaves much of the BID phenomenon
unexplained. It does not explain why property owners would vote in
favor of BIDs and thereby raise their own taxes, why BIDs are
increasingly popular, or why the BID statutes contain particular
limitations on ends and means. To answer these questions, the
remainder of this Part and Part III seeks to identify other latent ideas
embodied in BIDs.
C. An Economic Explanation: Collective Action Apart from the City
The second core idea latent in BIDs is an endorsement of small
scale collective action largely independent from city government.
This idea is best explained by welfare economic theory, which is the
application of economics to political science.
The economic explanation for the government provision of certain
services is that voluntary collective action to provide "public goods"
does not occur, even though collective action would benefit the
majority of individuals, because of "free rider" and "coordination"
problems. Fear of the "free rider," one who will not pay for the
collective (public) good but still profits from it, causes many not to
pay for the good (in the hope of likewise profiting without paying)
and hinders voluntary collective action. Alternatively, problems of
knowing what others want or how to implement the action might
doom voluntary collective activity.
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One government solution to the "free rider" problem is to attempt
to change social norms about voluntary contributions. 69 For example,
if property owners who do not "voluntarily" contribute to a local
improvement fund are thought of as "bad neighbors" by others and
themselves, participation rates will be much higher than if
contributing is seen as a "bad business judgment." Governments
therefore might use educational campaigns to encourage the
development of the "good neighbor" norm among property owners.
BIDs arguably could minimize free rider problems by helping to
shape local norms. BIDs are the "lowest possible level of
government," which has both the small size and the confidence of
the local property owners. BIDs are also a "public-private
partnership" with the expertise necessary to operate effectively.7'
They thus meet the suggested criteria for institutions that are most
effective for norm shaping.72
Norm shaping is not, however, always sufficient to solve the free
rider problem. An extensive study of English town centers concluded
that local voluntary "management schemes" were supported by less
than twenty percent of area merchants. 3 The study identified the
cause of the low participation rates as a view that "the firm next door
69. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945
(1996) ("The desire to contribute to a collective good is palpably a finction of social norms.").
70. Id. at 952 (stating that the lowest level of government is the "most likely to be
trusted").
71. See id. at 951-52 (favoring the change of norms through creative public-private
partnerships).
72. See id. at 952 ("Purely governmental efforts at norm management may fail for lack of
trust .... "). Professor Sunstein suggests that certain levels of government and certain
institutional arrangements are best suited to change norms. First, Sunstein asserts that "it is
probably best to have a presumption in favor of the lowest possible level of government." Id.
He argues that the local government is most responsive to the local people, most likely to be
trusted by the locals, and facilitates the conversations necessary for norm shaping. See id.
Second, Sunstein states that "public-private partnerships" are often the best approach to shaping
norms because private organizations "can have a high level of competence, experience, and
[public] trust." Id
73. See John Grigsby, Success Story Just Up Your High Street, THE TIMES (London), Apr.
22, 1996, at 12. This result is higher than what pure rational actor economic models would
suggest, but is in line with the "Behavioral Law and Economics" theory of economic action. See
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 905 n.2.
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is not paying its share," and suggested a "movement towards business
improvement districts." '74
The English study favored the use of BIDs because BID
assessments are mandatory and therefore prevent property owners
from "free riding" off of local improvements. Thus, property owners
will "voluntarily" vote to raise their own taxes because there is no
fear that the "firm next door" will not pay its own share. Because
BIDs prevent "free riders" in the local collective action they often
gain majority support.
In addition to free rider problems, local provision of increased
area services is also dependent on solving what might loosely be
termed "coordination" problems. First, property owners must believe
that the locality is capable of providing the cleaning service, either
with its own employees or by hiring a private contractor. Similarly,
property owners must believe that the locality will in fact increase
trash pickups and not divert the extra resources to other areas. In
addition, the locality must have some mechanism and incentive to
find out about and offer the service, an incentive usually provided by
political accountability.
BIDs coordinate local action. Property owners are assured that
BIDs will provide the area with the promised services because they
control the BIDs. Property owners create BIDs only on the condition
that the government not use them as an excuse for even worse
performance.75 The small size of BIDs ensures they will remain
responsive to local property owners' concerns. BIDs solve the free
rider and coordination problems and thereby enable local collective
action.
The rapid proliferation of BIDs suggests that they are enabling
local action that was not occurring when the urban city alone had the
coercive (taxing) power. Although BIDs do depend on urban city-
74. Grigsby, supra note 73, at 12.
75. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(a) (Consol. Supp. 1997). See Evans, supra
note 30, at El ("It's important that the legislation contain strong language preventing the city
from reducing services to a neighborhood because it has a business improvement district ....
We have to make sure a basic level of city services are guaranteed.") (quoting a business owner
within the proposed BID in D.C.).
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wide government for collection of the taxes, this a ministerial task.
Property owners apparently think BIDs are more capable than the
urban city government in providing services and in ensuring extra
resources to the service provision for which the funds are raised.
Similarly, BIDs appear to have greater incentive to obtain better
information about local needs than large urban city governments.
BIDs are filling the gap between the desire for local collective action
and the urban city's perceived or actual ability to solve the local
collective action problems.
The welfare economic explanation identifies a second core
insight-that BIDs enable local collective action apart from city
government. They solve free rider problems by providing an
institution that can coerce property owners as well as shape local
property owner norms. They provide "coordination" by their small
size, property owner's control, and proven success. Thus, BIDs are
"replacing city government" in the sense of providing the conditions
for collective action that was formerly only available at the city
level. '6
Despite the impressive explanatory power of both democratic and
economic accounts of the BID statute, significant features remain
unexplained. BIDs focus on public space, improve conditions for
pedestrians, and involve the public in planning the public realm.
Neither political nor economic theory explains these aspects of
BIDs. 7 A theory of architecture provides a third core idea of BIDs.
76. New York's Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, arguably the most prominent proponent of
BIDs, describes BIDs as "filling in for government." Lueck, supra note 37, at 1-1. The claim
that BIDs are providing services that city government no longer provides is shared by BID
supporters and opponents. See id. (quoting a BID critic as saying "[BIDs are] a perverse
exchange of responsibility between the public and private domains"); Clarence Johnson, A
Controversial Plan for S.F. Businesses to Tax Themselves, Money Would Provide More
Services, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 24, 1995, at All ("In essence, people are finding that
municipal government is not able to provide the services people think they ought to get .....
(quoting a proponent of BID legislation).
77. It is a common complaint that economic theory takes preferences as a given. In other
words, economics does not predict what people will want; it assumes people will decide for
themselves what they prefer. Applied to BIDs, the economic explanation assumes business
owners know what they need to do to attract shoppers. It thus does not predict that a BID statute
will make suggestions for how property owners should attract shoppers to the area. BID
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III. NEW URBANISM AND BIDS
This Part argues that New Urbanism's planning principles
complete the BID explanation. Although an architectural movement,
New Urbanism is best understood as an effort to put communitarian
rhetoric into practice. Accordingly, this Part begins with a brief
overview of communitarianism, then describes New Urbanism's
communitarian critique of the contemporary suburb as well as the
specific planning principles advocated by New Urbanism. This Part
then suggests that New Urbanism is the third idea latent in BIDs.
A. Three Communitarian Debates
Professor Stephen Gardbaum has identified three debates where
the term "community" is used in different ways." The first debate is
over "personal identity" and questions whether a person's
attachments, such as feelings for her friends or country, help
constitute that individual's identity (i.e., we are what we care about)
or whether these attachments are merely a collection of choices made
by a complete individual (i.e., a rational economic actor).79 The
second debate centers on whether moral "values" are significantly
particular to a "community" or are universal, existing outside of any
specific community.8'
The third debate, and one that often divides communitarians,
concerns the content of our community's values. Professor Gardbaum
statutes, however, do make specific suggestions, such as better landscaping and pedestrian
walkways. Whether this gap is a result of a theoretical weakness or is simply not the target of
economic theory, BID statutes are not completely explained by economics.
78. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law. Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 685, 692 (1992).
79. Id. at 692-93. According to Gardbaum, those taking the first Communitarian position
include Joseph Raz, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel. See id. at 693. Gerald Frug's effort to
imagine local government in Communitarian terms derives support for interlocal arrangements
from the idea that an individual (or a government) is partly created by its relationship with
others. See Gerald Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 253, 273 (1993)
("One way of decentering the subjectivity of localities would be to build on the literature that
emphasizes that the self is formed only through a relationship with others.").
80. See Gardbaum, supra note 78, at 694. Gardbaum identifies, among others, Benjamin
Barber, Michael Oakeshott, and Michael Walzer. See id.
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defines "strong communitarians" 8' as those who argue that people
should live as a "political community., 82 Put another way, strong
communitarians advocate the substantive value of community.83
Strong communitarians argue for shared values of wide "content and
scope.
8 4
Strong communitarians do not believe in open neighborhoods.
Communitarians, like pluralists and many other political theorists,
support strong local governments to encourage politically engaged
citizens. Their support of "substantive community," however, also
leads them to support local public policies that exclude outsiders.
So, for example, when localities seek to restrict who can move into
the neighborhood, strong communitarians defend the action on
"community" grounds.
Gardbaum argues that the pluralist position is inconsistent with
strong communitarianism.86 He notes that the world has many
different "political cultures and values."87 The strong communitarians
advocate the "value of community" even for communities that have
"substantively individualistic values."88 In contrast, pluralists such as
Michael Walzer seek to "foster[] the particular and diverse values of
different individual communities (whatever these values happen to
81. Id. at 695: The Amish or Mennonites represent examples of "strong communitarian"
communities. See id. at 740. Gardbaum identifies Michael Sandel, Hannah Arendt, and Alisdair
McIntyre. See id. In the legal academy, Gardbaum places advocates of "republicanism," such as
Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein, in this Communitarian camp. See id. at 750. On the
republican view, democracy "involves deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good
and helping to shape the destiny of the political community." Michael J. Sandel, America's
Search for a New Public Philosophy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1996, at 57.
82. Gardbaum, supra note 78, at 695; see also Sunstein, supra note 69, at 920 (describing
"norm communities" organized by locality that express communal norms in law); The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 249 (1989) (flag-buming as
symbolic speech).
83. Gardbaum, supra note 78, at 719 ("Strong communitarianism is a theory of
substantive community.").
84. Id. at 699.
85. See id. at 719 (classifying three "strongly communal types" of "substantive
community": conservative community, republican community, and communist community).
86. See id. at 730.
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id.
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Unlike strong communitarians, pluralists stress the importance of
a geographic neighborhood's "open doors" and diverse population.
For Michael Walzer, the neighborhood is "an association without an
organized or legally enforceable admissions policy."" As a result,
"[neighborhoods] will come in time, barring the use of force, to
include a heterogeneous population- 'not a selection, but rather a
specimen of life as a whole,' or at least of national life as a whole." 91
Although neighborhoods are random and complex associations, 92
their locations matter: "[P]olitics is always territorially based; and the
neighborhood (or the borough, town, township 'end' of town: the
contiguous set of neighborhoods) is historically the first, and still the
most immediate and obvious, base for democratic politics."'93 The
combination of seeing geographic neighborhoods as open institutions
and a good location for democratic politics drives much of Walzer's
influential work.'
B. Pluralist "Community" in New Urbanism
In 1981, the architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk
(together "DPZ") planned a small Florida beach town, Seaside, with
the "one overriding goal . . . of fostering a strong sense of
89. Id. at 699. Gardbaum identifies Walzer as a "communitarian" that, rather than
believing in "strong communitarianism," advocates liberal values held by our particular
community. See id at 699-700. In Gardbaum's description of Walzer, "[I]ndividualistic values
form a major part of the public culture of our society, which is a common possession of the
community as a whole." Id. at 698.
90. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 36 (1983).
91. Id. at224.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id. at 225.
94. Neighborhoods can only be "open," if the federal government performs certain tasks.
See id. at 44. For example, the federal government can make naturalization and distribution of
welfare more or less widely available. See id at 43-45. Location is also important at the federal
level: "[Tihe link between people and land is a crucial feature of national identity." Id. at 44.
Walzer's views on education are similarly caused by his position on neighborhoods and
territory. For example, Walzer opposes mandatory student busing to achieve racial integration
because it undermines the neighborhood school. See id. at 221-24.
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community."95 Since then, New Urbanism adherents have developed
other small towns and urban areas. 6 In The New Urbanism: Toward
an Architecture of Community,9 7 New Urbanists describe how to plan
a place that will create community.98
Like Gardbaum's political theorists, New Urbanists use
"community" in three ways. First, they argue that people are formed
in important ways by their attachments. Second, they implicitly argue
that community provides the source of values. Third, like the
pluralists (and therefore unlike the strong communitarians), New
Urbanism advocates mixed and, by implication, open
neighborhoods.99 New Urbanists use these arguments to both critique
the contemporary suburb and to support specific urban planning
principles.
New Urbanists argue that the suburbs have disconnected people
from who and what they care about."l° The contemporary suburban
development patterns, New Urbanists claim, have "isolate[d] people
and activities in an inefficient network of congestion and pollution,
rather than joining them in diverse and human-scaled
95. Charles Mulford Robinson, Establishing the Urban Pattern, in KATZ, NEW
URBANISM, supra note 10, at 3.
96. The largest new town is Celebration, a massive traditional development by Disney.
See Caroline E. Mayer, The Mickey House Club: It's Cute, It's Communal It's Affluent, But
Disney's Town Experiment Has Dissenters, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al.
97. Seesupra note 10.
98. Most of this Article's New Urbanism discussion is drawn from KATZ, NEW
URBANISM, supra note 10. See also Kurt Anderson, Oldfangled New Towns: A Brilliant
Husband-and-Wife Team Lead a Growing Movement to Replace Charmless Suburban Sprawl
with Civilized, Familiar Places That People Love, TIME, May 20, 1991, at 52.
99. New Urbanism is therefore in the tradition of Jane Jacobs who famously argued for
mixed uses of an area. See Jane Jacobs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES:
THE FAILURE OF TOWN PLANNING 152-77, 222-28 (1961); see also Richard Ford Thompson,
The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841,
1908 n.215 (1994).
100. See Peter Calthorpe, The Region, in KATZ, NEW URBANISM, supra note 10, at xii.
New Urbanism begins with an account of suburban growth. Americans moved to the suburbs to
find privacy, safety and home ownership. They were helped by a federal government providing
highways and subsidized home mortgages. See id. As a suburb's population increased, it
attracted jobs and became what Joel Garreau calls "Edge Cities" which have their own suburbs.
See id The process repeats, the suburbs sprawl, and the American landscape takes on a
"homogenous quality ... with chain-store architect, scaleless office parks and monotonous
subdivisions." Id.
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communities."'' New Urbanists further assert that Americans
increasingly feel "placeless" and that feelings of attachment to a
location are not possible when everywhere looks the same. 2 New
Urbanism applies the communitarian claim about the constitutive
nature of an individual's attachments, in this case to people, activities
and places, to make a bleak assessment of how Americans are
building the "American Dream.'
0 3
DPZ believe that "the combination of a focus and a limit" can
restore a sense of place to a location.' For a focus, DPZ require a
"center" for every neighborhood.'0 5 The center is the "locus" of
public activity, where a post office, shops, banks and day care centers
are located."° The limit or "edge," which is not always necessary, is
often a natural boundary, such as a train line, park, or busy road. 7
To avoid the disconnection of the suburbs, DPZ argue that a
neighborhood must be pedestrian friendly.'08 Daily routines, such as
shopping, must be within walking distance. DPZ therefore suggest
that the best neighborhood size is a "quarter mile from center to
101. Id. at xii.
102. See id. As Calthorpe described:
Out of [the] evolution of the modem metropolis there has grown a profound sense of
frustration and placelessness. . . . At their extreme, the new forms (of suburban
architecture) seem to have an empty feeling, reinforcing our mobile state and the
instability of our families. Moving at a speed which allows only generic symbols to be
recognized, we cannot wonder that the man-made environment seems trite and over-
stated.
Id.
By "[u]nderstanding the qualities of nature in each place, expressing it in the design of
communities, integrating it within our towns and respecting its balance," id. at xiii, New
Urbanism tries to create a "sense of place" in suburban developments. Id. at xx.
103. See id. at xii ("Ironically, the American Dream is now increasingly out of sync with
today's culture. Our household makeup has changed dramatically, the workplace and work
force have been transformed, family wealth is shrinking and grave environmental concerns have
surfaced.").
104. Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Neighborhood, the District and the
Corridor, in KATZ, NEW URBANISM, supra note 10, at xvii, xx.
105. Seeid. atxvii.
106. See id
107. See id. at xviii.
108. See id.
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edge."' 9 Similarly, New Urbanism insists that streets should be
designed to facilitate their use by pedestrians. "° Local streets should
"provide equitably for pedestrian comfort and for automobile
movement.""' Slower cars and more pedestrians, a function of street
design, "encourage[] the casual meetings that form the bonds of
community.,112
According to DPZ, a "sense of place" is also encouraged by
insisting that public activities occur in prominent places."' DPZ insist
that public buildings for schools, local government and libraries
occupy important sites.' Giving "priority to public space"
contributes to civic pride and reinforces community identity." 5 In
addition, a central concern of New Urbanism is the existence of a
"public realm."".6 A public realm is "that shared space in society
which brings people to gather together, to relate to one another and/or
to be separate."'' New Urbanism is "above all ... about ensuring
that there is a public realm.""'
New Urbanism also applies the pluralist concern for open
109. Id. New Urbanism's proposal of a specific size of a neighborhood avoids problems
caused by the lack of local boundaries. As Briffault argues:
Only the metropolitan area is expansive enough to include most of the daily activities
and social and economic concerns of the residents of metropolitan area localities. Yet
it is difficult for most area residents to conceive of the metropolitan area as a
community. With millions of people scattered across a sprawling network of localities,
the contemporary metropolitan area typically "lacks any definable borders, a center or
a periphery." The economic and cultural relations that bind a region together are
largely invisible to most residents, who are likely to view their home locality as their
community and to view the metropolitan area as little more than a Census designation.
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1115, 1143 (1996) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Briffault, Local Government].
110. See Elizabeth Moule & Stefanos Polyzoides, The Street, the Block and the Building, in
KATZ, NEW URBANISM, supra note 10, at xii.
111. Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 104, at xix.
112. Id.
113. See id. at xix.
114. See id.
115. Id. atxix.
116. See Moule & Polyzoides, supra note 110, at xxi.
117. Id. at xxi.
118. Id. at xxii.
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neighborhoods. New Urbanists contend that "[s]ettlement patterns are
the physical foundation of our society and, like our society, they are
more and more fractured.""' 9 The demographic separation endemic to
the suburbs reinforces separation in the political realm because
"[s]pecial interest groups now replace the larger community within
our political landscape, just as gated subdivisions have replaced
neighborhoods."' 2 ° Just as Michael Walzer's pluralism calls for
"open," "random" neighborhoods, New Urbanism calls for mixed
neighborhoods with all types of people and activities. Furthermore
DPZ argue that a place must encompass a "balanced mix of
activities-dwelling, shopping, working, schooling, worshipping and
recreating."' 22 DPZ maintain that "the modem North American
workplace is no longer a bad neighbor to dwellings and shops."'" In
other words, neighborhoods should be "open" to both people and
activities.
Nevertheless, New Urbanism explicitly tolerates urbanized
districts "that are functionally specialized."' 24 New Urbanists do
suggest that "few pure districts are really justified."'" Conceding that
some level of specialization is inevitable, New Urbanists note that
119. Calthorpe, supra note 100, at xii.
120. Id.
121. Seeid.atxvi.
Diversity is a fundamental component of Urbanism at both the neighborhood and
regional scale. At the regional scale it is too often taken for granted-but diversity
without connections (segregated diversity) is not urban at any scale. The diverse
population and functions within a region should have a connecting fabric which makes
the region vital and inclusionary. Our freeway and arterial networks now seem to
privatize and isolate the components of a region more than connect them.
Id.
122. Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 104, at xvii.
123. Id. New Urbanists propose (and have built) telecommuter centers. Workers leave
home but, rather than commute to work, work from terminals at the center. Thus, DPZ use
modem computer technology, often derided for increasing isolation, to improve the sense of
neighborhood attachment
124. Id. at xix. DPZ argue: "Although [specialized] districts preclude the full range of
activities necessary for a complete neighborhood, they are not the rigorously single activity
zones of suburbia: the office parks, housing subdivisions or shopping centers. The
specialization of a district still allows multiple activities to support its primary identity." Id.
125. Id. at xix.
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"[c]lear boundaries and dimensions facilitate the formation of special
taxing or management organizations.' 26
Again like the pluralists, New Urbanism seeks to involve the local
public in planning and controlling the public realm.127 At the planning
stage, New Urbanists hold on-site "charrettes" where the
development firm "confers with local officials, community leaders
and interest groups; stages public meetings and presentations; and
calls in local architects, planners and citizens to collaborate."' 128 New
Urbanism argues that a zoning code would serve as a "covenant
among the owners, designers and users" of a place and "the
individual interests and actions will incrementally but inevitably
generate the public realm."'
29
C. New Urbanism in BIDs
By adhering to many of New Urbanism's planning principles,
BIDs promote "community," as New Urbanist's understand the
phrase. 30
126. Id. at xx.
127. See also Stephen C. Fehr, A Downtown of Their Own; Kentlands Residents Seek
Intimate Setting, WASH. POST, March 25, 1996, at DI (describing a weekend charrette where
residents will help plan part of town and noting the "demalling" of America because shoppers
prefer to be outside rather than in a mall).
128. Yale Architects Breathing Life Into Urban Areas, YALE MAGAZINE, Mar. 11, 1996, at
17 (defining "charrette" as a "three-or-four day period in which ... architects work intensely
with each other and with members of the community in developing a plan to revitalize a town
or neighborhood" and describing volunteer efforts of Yale architecture students to assist 250
neighborhood residents of a neighborhood that received a HUD grant in "asses(ing] their wants
and needs for the neighborhood and . . . incorporating them into a vision of physical
community"); Todd W. Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in KATZ, NEW URBANISM,
supra note 10, at xxxvi; see also Fehr, supra note 127, at D1 (describing DPZ's recent
charrette in Kentlands).
129. Moule & Polyzoides, supra note 110, at xxiv. New Urbanism is, however, criticized
for failing to consider the "layers of community organization [that] will evolve" after the
charrette's decisions are implemented. See Bressi, supra note 128, at xlii.
130. See generally Calthorpe, supra note 100, at xvi. As Calthorpe summarized:
The goal [of New Urbanism] is to apply the best of urban design to both the region and
the neighborhood-applying them to a new context and at a new scale. The New
Urbanism is not just about the city or the suburb. It is about the way we conceive of
community and how we form the region-it is about diversity, scale and public space
in every context.
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1. BIDs Restore a Sense of Place
As New Urbanism recommends, BIDs define an edge.13 The
district plan must have a map with well defined boundaries. The
district's center is often the focus of BID "improvement" efforts as
well as the location for additional services.'32 BIDs define an edge
and focus attention on the center thereby restoring a sense of place to
the area.'33
New Urbanism also makes suggestions to increase the number of
pedestrians on city blocks. Buildings should be serviced from alleys
to allow the "outer faces of blocks to become more intensely
pedestrian."' 34 Significant indoor interior spaces, such as lobbies, are
an "extension of the public space of the city." '35 New Urbanism
insists that "[a]ccommodating the pedestrian is the first order of
priority for parking."' 36 Parking garages should be underground or in
the middle of the block, in a building with a "significant public
face."'37 New Urbanists encourage landscaping, such as trees and
parks, because these "artifacts from man's historical contact with
nature" remain critical to successful urban life.
38
Again in keeping with New Urbanism, BID statutes focus on
improving pedestrian movement. 39  BIDs are responsible for
improving public landscaping, making decision about street size and
use and constructing various pedestrian structures. 4 ' Similarly, the
usual small size of BIDs is consistent with New Urbanism's "quarter
d
New Urbanism urban planning ideas have already influenced New York's zoning laws. See
Bressi, supra note 128, at xxxviii.
131. New Urbanism advocates that every neighborhood have a center and an edge, or outer
limit. See Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 104, at xvii.
132. Seeid
133. Similarly, New Urbanism emphasizes the importance of creating "a sense of place for
its users." Id. at xx.
134. Moule & Polyzoides, supra note 110, at xxiii.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 980-c(a)(5), (7), (11) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
140. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 980-c(a)(1), (5), (7) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
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mile" or "walking distance" rule.
14 1
Enacting a BID also gives priority to public space. When property
owners voluntarily increase their taxes to improve the public areas,
public space is improved and the social identity of a place reaffirmed.
Indeed, BIDs may sometimes offer the only way to ensure there is
any public space.
2. BIDs Encourage Diverse Neighborhoods and Local Political
Activity
Property owners create and fund BIDs in part to attract shoppers.
With increased numbers of shoppers, the profits of property owners'
business tenants, and thus the property's value, will increase.
Therefore, the first goal of a BID is to "preserv[e] and enhanc[e]
commercial enterprise in the traditional business centers of the cities
and towns."'42 Unlike other proposals to restore downtown areas,
BIDs focus on attracting shoppers, not businesses, to the area. This
"attraction" goal fits the pluralist notion of "open" neighborhoods.'43
New Urbanism would tolerate the development of BIDs because
BIDs' specialization, if any, would not lead to isolation.'" First, BIDs
often seek to enrich the activities of an area. Second, and more
importantly, BIDs can co-exist with other institutions seeking to
bring different types of activities or people to the same "district."
BIDs also provide a forum for citizens to deliberate about the
"public realm.' 45 Rudolph Giuliani, current Mayor of New York
City, describes BIDs as "local democratic institutions."'4 Indeed,
although BIDs are not "equal" in the simple Avery sense, they are
democratic in the sense that residents and property owners together
design the neighborhood's "public realm."
In summary, the third core idea latent in BIDs is pluralist
141. See Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 104, at xviii.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 1501 (Supp. 1996).
143. See WALZER, supra note 90, at 36.
144. See Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 104, at xix ("The specialization of a district
still allows multiple activities to support its primary identity.").
145. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18 for a discussion of the "public realm."
146. Lueck, supra note 37, at 1-1.
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community. BIDs restore a sense of place to the area by creating an
edge and improving the center, making the area more suitable for
pedestrians and giving priority to public space. BIDs foster pluralism
by involving the public in planning the "public realm" and by
working to attract people to the neighborhood.
IV. BID REFORMS
Understanding BIDs as endorsing specific democratic, economic
and architectural theories suggests that the best changes to BID
statutes are those derived from one of the three theories: political
theory, welfare economics and New Urbanism. As an illustration, this
Part first derives from each of the three theories a proposed
modification to the BID statutes. Second, this Part uses the BID
interpretation to evaluate the most common proposals for how to
modify BIDs.
A. Three Internal Suggestions
1. Political Theory: Courts Should Monitor BID Voting
Arrangements
Current BID statutes provide no role for the courts. As a result,
citizens that believe a particular BID's voting scheme is unfair must
rely on general state or federal constitutional voting rights doctrines.
BID statutes do not provide such a litigant with much, if any,
assistance. Current BID statutes thus appear to endorse Justice
Harlan's view of no role for the courts in monitoring the correlation
between power and interest. 47
This limited role for courts appears inconsistent with much of the
content of BID statutes. BID statutes endorse Justice Fortas' (rather
than Justice Harlan's) view of the possibility of classifying
government by their limited powers. 4 More importantly, BID
147. See Avery, 390 U.S. at 487-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 507 (Fortas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c (Consol.
Supp. 1997) (listing BID powers).
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statutes contemplate a fairly significant role for non-property owners.
For example, the New York BID statute reserves four seats on the
board of the district management association (DMA) for city wide
representation. 149 Yet, it requires only that tenants "also be
represented." 50
The New York statute might, through an amendment, require, in
Justice Fortas' phrase, that non-property owners have an "adequate,
effective voice" in the operation and governance of a BID.' 5' Even
under the amendment, many of the voting structures of the BID
would remain unchanged. Nevertheless, litigants could challenge
those individual BIDs that seem most unfair without having to rely
on the Supreme Court doctrines, which do not work well in the BID
context. 52 An amendment providing assurance of an "adequate,
effective voice," would help insulate BIDs from charges of
undemocratic and unequal operation while preserving property
owners' control, which is critical to their approval of increased taxes.
2. Welfare Economics: BIDs Should Have Sufficient Eminent
Domain Authority to Seize Abandoned Buildings
Abandoned buildings harm neighborhoods.'53 "An abandoned
home .. may be conceptualized ... as a negative externality."' 5 4
Empty houses "become magnets of vandalism, havens for crime, and
fire hazards to the buildings around them."' 55 Abandoned buildings
are a "negative externality" imposed on current property owners by a
former property owner. Urban city government often takes a long
time to address the problem of a single abandoned building.
BIDs have a strong incentive to eliminate abandoned buildings
because they reduce property values. BIDs are small enough to
149. See N.Y. GEN. MtN. LAW § 980-m(b) (Consol. Supp. 1997).
150. Id.
151. Avery, 390 U.S. at 509 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
152. See supra Part I.A.
153. See Joshua A. Newberg, Anatomy of a Housing Program: Urban Homesteading in
Theory and Practice, 8 J.L. & POL. 731, 751-52 (1992).
154. Id.at751.
155. Id. at 752.
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remain responsive to such a local concern, but under current BID
statutes, there is little a BID can do to address the problem of
abandoned buildings.
Providing BIDs with a narrow form of eminent domain would
allow the BIDs to force the owner of the uninhabited property to stop
damaging the neighborhood or risk losing title. Historically, localities
have addressed the problem of abandoned buildings. 56 There is
precedent for giving eminent domain authority to public and/or
private organizations.57 States could, for example, allow a BID
district plan, which is subject to city approval, to indicate abandoned
buildings that it would like to seize provided that the plan establishes
the status of abandoned buildings and provides a detailed proposal
for rehabilitation of the site.
3. New Urbanism: BIDs Should Have Some Zoning Authority
One of New Urbanism's most important methods of creating a
"sense of place" involves zoning.'58 For example, parking
requirements should be set at a neighborhood or district basis as
opposed to building by building.'59 "Specific street, block and
building design rules for public or private developments" must be
"presented in the form of a code."'" To maintain a sense of
neighborhood identity, the zoning code should exert an
"extraordinary level of control... to force greater attention to detail,
thereby invigorating suburban architecture and imparting a greater
level of civility to the street-scape."'
61
Consistent with New Urbanism, neighborhood BIDs should have
156. See id. at 733.
157. See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (1996) ("[S]tatutes in several states
authorize private redevelopment corporations to exercise the power of eminent domain."). For
example, in Massachusetts, a private project to redevelop a "blighted open, decadent or
substandard area" may exercise the power of eminent domain. Id. at 1074-75.
158. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
159. See Moule & Polyzoides, supra note 110, at xxiv.
160. Id
161. Bressi, supra note 128, at xxxv.
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some influence over zoning decisions. BIDs should work to
encourage property owners to create an architectural identity for the
district, perhaps by establishing a recommended zoning code. DPZ
suggest a scheme whereby proposed developments that comply with
a neighborhood's master plan are exempt from certain (time
consuming) planning reviews.62 One way to do this is to allow the
district plan to contain zoning rules, such as permissible setbacks or
total parking spaces for the district. Regardless of the form, city
governments should shift some zoning authority to BID officials.
B. Two Common Proposals
In addition to generating BID reforms, BID interpretation also
helps evaluate proposed reforms. This Part considers the two most
common BID reforms proposals: expanding their size and
encouraging their formation in low property value areas.
1. BIDs Should Never Cover More than a Single Neighborhood
Although most BID statutes do not restrict the geographic size of
a BID, 63 BIDs should always be and often are neighborhood size."6
Small BIDs are consistent with DPZ's "walking distance" or "quarter
mile" rule, reinforcing the sense of place by defining an edge and a
center on a pedestrian scale.'65 From an economic perspective,
restricting the size of a BID appears critical to its ultimate success.'66
162. See Bressi, supra note 128, at xxxvii.
163. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-a (Consol. Supp. 1997).
164. Most improvement districts include only one neighborhood. See Oser, supra note 36,
at A3 ("It is at the small neighborhood level rather than in the central business district that most
of the business improvement districts have been formed."); Evans, supra note 30, at C2 ("BIDs
are extremely important to the economic health of neighborhoods .... [Tihe most important
part of them is that they organize and focus activities of businesses from neighborhood to
neighborhood."); see also Enrique Lavin, Merchants Propose Improvement Districts, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at B2 ("'With the city cutting back we see a need to improve our two-
block area on our own."') (quoting a local business owner).
165. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of DPZ's
"edge/center" principle.
166. Small BIDs promote efficient provision of services. Charles Tiebout, a leading
political economist, proposed that potential residents select a locality based on the mix of
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Democratic participation also requires confining BIDs to
neighborhoods that citizens already identify as political units.'67 In
sum, each of the three latent BID principles (political theory, welfare
economics, and New Urbanism) suggest keeping BIDs small.
2. Contributors to BIDs in Low Property Value Areas Should
Receive Partial Rebates
Professor Robert Nelson argues that "troubled inner-city"
neighborhoods should establish BIDs.es One way to encourage this
development would be to provide property owners in poor districts
with rebates for BID assessments. New York's deputy mayor spoke
of offering a rebate of fifty percent of the assessments that property
owners pay to be part of the district. 69 Because states and counties
also benefit from the BID-led revival of urban areas, state and federal
governments could help cities provide the rebates.
Such a proposal makes sense from the perspectives of all three
BID principles. Professor Skully writes:
services and taxes rates. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Government, 64 J.
POL. ECoN. 416, 417 (1956), cited in Briffault, Local Government, supra note 109, at 1124-25.
Under his theory, some localities would offer low taxes and low services while other localities
would offer higher taxes and more services. Potential residents would pick among the localities,
and those localities that offered a popular mix of services and taxes would grow while those
who failed to offer an attractive package would lose residents. Thus, localities are pressed to be
"efficient"; otherwise a similar locality would provide the same level of services for lower
taxes. The balance of taxes and services provided by BIDs might mimic this pattern. Potential
property owners and shoppers might choose an area based on the mix of BID rates and services.
Some might prefer an area with an active BID, such as one that holds frequent marketing events
and employs many extra sanitation workers, and willingly pay the higher BID fees. Others
might prefer lower costs and want a BID to provide only minimal services. Still others might
prefer an area without a BID, just as some residents choose to live in "unincorporated" areas.
The more BIDS, the more likely BIDs will remain efficient and diverse. Concentrating many
BIDs in the same area requires that each BID be small.
167. Although all advocates of local government suggest "small districts," they rarely
define how small is small, often describing New York City as small. As Part I of this Article
suggests, a neighborhood-size BID is consistent with Michael Walzer's claim that the
neighborhood is the best location for active democratic politics. See supra notes 145-46 and
accompanying text. See also WALZER, supra note 90, at 36-37.
168. Robert H. Nelson, Privatize Inner-City Neighborhoods, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov./Dec.
1996, at 68.
169. See Martin, supra note 12, at B3.
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[One] cannot help but hope that the lessons of Seaside [in
Florida] and of the other new towns now taking shape can be
applied to the problem of housing for the poor. That is where
community is most needed and where it has been most
disastrously destroyed. Center city would truly have to be
broken down into its intrinsic neighborhoods if this were to
take place within it.'70
The need for collective action might well be higher in poor
neighborhoods, where "coordination" problems such as information
may abound. Moreover, democratically, it is essential that a local
institution as effective as BIDs exist (or at least be a realistic option)
in every area.'
7
'
V. BIDs AND INTERLOCAL EQUALITY
The most common criticism of BIDs is that they contribute to
interlocal "inequality."'' To press this complaint, the BID critic must
170. Skully, supra note 10, at 229.
171. It is surprising how rarely advocates for the disorganized or disenfranchised advocate
for local government institutions. See, eg., Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of
Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995).
172. Another concern is that BIDs will harm the homeless. As one writer puts it, there is a
"fear that the [BIDs] would ultimately pay for private security forces to sweep away people as
well as debris." Johnson, supra note 76, at Al1. This objection might be either to the method of
"encouraging" certain people to leave or to the goal itself. Whether BIDs are more likely than
city governments to use undesirable methods to achieve agreed-upon goals is an empirical
question. Quite possibly, homeless advocates will have an easier time pressuring and
monitoring local BIDs than they would with larger urban city governments. As to the goal, the
success of suburban malls has contributed to the deterioration of urban downtown property
values and the depletion of city governments' tax base, and has also increased the isolation and
the numbers of the very poor. See generally Calthorpe, supra note 100, at xii ("[O]ur city
centers have deteriorated because much of their economic vitality has decanted to the
suburbs."). Arguably, the success of the suburban mall is driven by the mall's owners ability to
exclude people that most shoppers want excluded. See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1172 n.28
("In general, the private owner of a regional shopping mall has greater authority over the use of
its common areas than a city has over the use of open-access public lands."). Moreover, as the
New Urbanists remind, the demise of public urban life has decreased feelings of community
with negative effects on our democratic and personal lives. See id. ("Americans initially moved
to the suburbs for privacy, mobility, security and home ownership. What we now have is
isolation, congestion, rising crime, pollution and overwhelming costs . . . ."). Whether an
accommodation that allows all to enter the public space but requires all to abide by certain
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explain either why interlocal inequality of any sort is undesirable, or
why the type of inequality perpetuated by BIDs is undesirable.
Neither proposition is accurate. Instead, BIDs represent a
commitment to the urban realm that may well further egalitarian
goals.
A. Interlocal Inequality Is Inevitable
Some BID critics assume that any difference in provision of
services, such as increased police or garbage collection, is
undesirable. As Professor Frug writes, "it is no more justifiable, in
my view, for the quality of police protection, hospitals, or welfare
programs to vary with district wealth than it is for the quality of the
schools.""' This is "bad utopianism" at a local level.'74
As Michael Walzer points out, inequality is inherent in any
society.'75 An America where location did not correlate with
increased social goods would be unrecognizable. Only continual
intervention by a totalitarian state could prevent variations in the
quality of localities' schools, police protection, and so forth. The key
for equality advocates is to identify and minimize those inequalities
that are undesirable, such as significant differences in educational
quality, and ignore those that are the inevitable effects of a
democratic, welfare capitalistic society, such as differences in
frequency of garbage pick-up. 76
B. BIDs Are Not Contributing to Undesirable Interlocal Inequality
Other critics argue that BIDs are undesirable because they
uniformly enforced rules might better balance the concern for individual autonomy with the
need for successful public urban space is a normative judgment that a political community must
make.
173. Frug, supra note 79, at 327.
174. See MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 4 (1997).
175. See WALZER, supra note 90, at 3-6.
176. As Professor Briffault's critique of funding local services with property taxes suggests
"[w]ith municipal budgets largely dependent on the local tax base, intermunicipal wealth
inequality becomes the source of significant differences in the quantity and quality of public
services." Richard Briffault, Localism, supra note 52, at 437-38.
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represent a "balkanization" of the urban city. To repeat Sandel's
remark, "[a]s municipal services decline in urban areas, residents and
businesses in upscale districts manage to insulate themselves from the
effects by assessing themselves surtaxes to provide private garbage
collection, street cleaning, and police protection unavailable to the
city as a whole."' 77 Sandel argues that the problem with BIDs is that
they "erode those aspects of community life that bring rich and poor
together in public places and pursuits."' 78
BIDs are not, in fact, contributing to the balkanization of the city.
Sandel's critique of BIDs is followed by his endorsement of New
Urbanism.'79 As Part III of this Article shows, BIDs are consistent
with many principles of New Urbanism. Had Sandel acknowledged
that BIDs promote rather than undermine the "class mixing" that he
seeks to further, he might well determine that BIDs are helping to
move towards, not away from, a more "egalitarian" society.
Finally, BIDs are not always, and certainly need not be, confined
to wealthy areas.'80 If all areas had BIDs, the claim that BIDs are
contributing to balkanization reduces to the already rejected claim
that any variation among localities is unacceptable.
C. BIDs Represent a Commitment to the Urban Public Realm
A related but deeper challenge is, in Albert Hirschman's words,
that BIDs replace "voice," or political pressure, with "exit," or opting
out."8' Precisely because BIDs allow localities to succeed without city
government, cities may lose those most likely to advocate for needed
changes. The result is a less effective city government for all, and
less services for those without BIDs.' 82
177. DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, supra note 5, at 331.
178. Id. at 332.
179. Seeid. at336.
180. See supra Part IV.A.2.
181. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
182. One manifestation of this criticism is the requirement that BIDs only provide services
above those provided by the city. To the extent this provision in fact prevents cities from
reducing services to the BID area, concerns about "exit" are reduced. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §
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This critique confuses city government with city life."83 An
"investment" through voluntarily increased property taxes in urban
public services beyond those provided by the city does not represent
a withdrawal from urban public life even if it occurs independent
from the sometimes ineffectual city governments. BIDs represent a
commitment to, not an abandonment of, cities.
84
Empowering neighborhoods through the formation of BIDs
should disproportionately help the poor, both by reviving the urban
city and thereby restoring a tax base to the city government, and by
enabling collective action in poor neighborhoods which have the
most to gain. The egalitarian position on BIDs is precisely
backwards.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article was to interpret Business Improvement
Districts (BIDs). Drawing from democratic, economic, and
architectural theories, the Article identified three core ideas in BID
statutes. First, BIDs contain a specific conception of local political
equality, an understanding that differs from that adopted by the
Supreme Court. Second, BIDs reflect an endorsement of small scale
collective action apart from urban municipal government. The third
guiding idea of BID statutes is the restoration of "community" to
urban neighborhoods. This Article argued that BIDs do not contribute
to undesirable interlocal inequality, but rather represent a
commitment to the urban public realm.
200.12(a) (1997) (requiring federal funding under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 to "supplement, and in no case supplant, the level of services" already
provided by private schools), cited in Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2004 (1997).
183. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, The Loss Is Personal, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1997, at
A19 ("In consistently fighting for home rule, I have always thought that I was fighting for D.C.
residents, not the D.C. government").
184. As the fiont page headline heralding Washington, D.C.'s new district stated, "owners
commit" to D.C. See Stephen C. Fehr, Property Owners Commit to Revive D.C., WASH. POST,
July 27, 1997, at AI.
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